We investigate the relations between different types of perfect equilibrium, introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium in this context, the classical "trembling hand" approach, and the so-called "finitistic" approach. We propose an improved definition of the finitistic approach, called global-limit-offinite perfection, and prove its existence.
Despite the fact that the finitistic approach appeals to basic intuition, our results-specifically examples (1) and (2)-seem to imply a severe critique on this approach. In the first example any version of finitistic perfect equilibrium admits a Nash equilibrium strategy profile that is not limit admissible. The second example gives a completely mixed (and hence trembling hand perfect) Nash equilibrium that is not finitistically perfect.
Further examples illustrate the relations between the two approaches to perfect equilibrium and the relation to admissibility and undominatedness of strategies.
Introduction
In 1995 Simon and Stinchcombe [24] , for brevity referred to as S&S in this paper, defined perfect equilibrium for games with an infinite compact set of actions. They distinguished two main lines of definitions of perfection. The first line is based on the notion of a completely mixed strategy, giving rise to the notions of strongly perfect and weakly perfect equilibrium. This approach can be viewed as a direct generalization of the original trembling hand definition of perfect equilibrium introduced by Selten [23] . The second line of definitions, in S&S referred to as the finitistic approach, uses the notion of an ε-perfect equilibrium in finite approximations of the original game. The resulting notion of perfect equilibrium is called limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium 1 . They showed that the first type of perfect equilibrium only admits limit admissible strategies.
Furthermore, they conjectured that the two approaches are incomparable.
Perfect equilibrium in games with infinite action spaces is a useful tool to select Nash equilibria, for example in auction models with incomplete information, such as the ones studied in Compte and Jehiel [6] and Crémer et al. [7] , where dominant strategies are not available as a selection criterion. Concrete applications of perfect equilibrium in infinite strategic form games can among others be found in Jackson et al. [11] , S & S [24] , and Anderson et al. [2] .
In this paper we investigate the existing relations between the various types of perfect equilibrium within the framework of strategic form games with compact action spaces and continuous payoff functions.
The diagram below gives an overview of those relations between different types of perfect equilibrium that are currently known. Strongly perfect, weakly perfect, and lof (limit-of-finite) perfect equilibrium are introduced by S&S. Strongly glof (global limit-of-finite) and weakly glof perfect equilibrium are introduced in this paper. Limit undominated Nash equilibrium, a stronger version of limit admissibility from S&S, is also introduced in this paper. 
(1)
(2) (2) Boldface arrows indicate valid implications. For example, every strongly glof perfect equilibrium is a lof perfect equilibrium. Roman face arrows indicate implications that do not hold in general. Counterexamples are provided by previous studies, and examples (1) to (5) in this paper.
Related literature
Equilibrium selection and refinement theory already have a long and steady-going tradition, arguably starting with essential equilibrium (Wu Wen-Tsün and Jiang Jia-He [26] ), perfect equilibrium (Selten [23] )
and proper equilibrium (Myerson [20] ) for finite strategic form games. Theory on refinements for games with compact action spaces has been developed in, among others, Méndez et al. [15] , Simon and Stinchcombe [24] , and CarbonellNicolau [4] . Developments on refinements in the context of extensive form games are for example sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson [14] ) and theory on strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens [13] , Hillas [10] , Mertens [16] [17] , and more recently Govindan and Wilson [9] ).
The above line of literature mainly concerns what Andersson et al. [2] refer to as "strategic uncertainty" where a player is required to play strategies that guarantee robustness against possible mistakes by a player's opponents. An alternative line of research on equilibrium refinement is on "structural uncertainty" where, due to informational uncertainty, iterated deletion of dominated strategies is
used as a refinement technique. This approach, also known as the global games approach, was developed by Carlsson and van Damme [5] , with applications in for example banking and finance (Morris and Shin [19] ).
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Results The paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution is the introduction of global limit-of-finite perfection, from now on referred to as glof perfection. S&S already introduced lof perfect equilibrium as the limit of ε-perfect equilibria of large but finite approximations of the original game.
Despite its relative straightforward intuition, lof perfect equilibrium does not always select available dominant strategies.
Strongly glof perfect equilibrium is defined in the same way as lof perfect equilibrium, but with the added requirement that best responses in the approximating games are in fact best responses in the original game. Strongly glof perfect equilibrium is a stronger version of finitistic perfection than lof perfect equilibrium.
Weakly glof perfect equilibrium adds to the definition of lof perfection the weak requirement that best responses in the approximating games are only close to best responses in the original game. We show existence of weakly glof perfect equilibrium. Moreover, we show that weakly (and therefore also strongly) glof perfect equilibrium does uniquely select dominant strategy Nash equilibria as soon as dominant strategies are available to a player.
Second, we provide five illustrative counterexamples. Example 1 presents a strongly glof perfect equilibrium that is not limit admissible. This result is in line with Example 2.4 of S&S of a lof perfect equilibrium that is not limit admissible. Example 2 verifies the conjecture of Simon and Stinchcombe that strong perfection does not imply finitistic perfection. More precisely, it is an example a completely mixed, and therefore strongly perfect, equilibrium that is neither lof pefect (and therefore also not anchored perfect) nor weakly (and therefore also not strongly) glof perfect. Example 3 presents a weakly glof perfect equilibrium that is not lof perfect, and therefore also not strongly glof perfect. Example 4 is in fact equivalent to Example 2.4 of S&S with the added feature that the action spaces are intervals instead of the union of an interval and an isolated point.
Example 5 is a comment on the theorem of van Damme that for bimatrix games a Nash equilibrium is perfect precisely when the equilibrium strategies are undominated. This equivalence no longer holds in the more general context of two-player games with compact action spaces and continuous payoff functions.
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Example 5 presents a Nash equilibrium of a 2 × (∞ + 1)-bimatrix game in undominated strategies that is not weakly perfect. An added feature of the example is that there is another Nash equilibrium in this game that is payoff equivalent to the first Nash equilibrium, while the second Nash equilibrium is weakly perfect. Thus, weakly perfect equilibrium is not invariant, in contrast to perfect equilibrium for finite strategic form games. The example highlights the fact that for infinite compact action spaces, the topology on the action spaces starts to matter for perfection.
Except for Example 4, all our examples use countably infinite pure action spaces.
We specifically chose not to use compact intervals as action spaces, in order to highlight the underlying logic of the constructions. It is nevertheless evident from the constructions that, with a bit (well, for some examples perhaps a bit more than a bit) of extra work the examples can also be transformed to counterexamples on the unit interval.
Preliminaries
For a metric space (X, d), a set U ⊆ X is open if for every x ∈ U there is an ε > 0 such that if y ∈ X and d(x, y) < ε then y ∈ U . The topology on X induced by metric d is the collection of all open sets we can thus construct.
For a topological space X, the Borel σ-field on X is the smallest σ-field that contains all open sets. A probability measure on X is a function µ from a σ-field Σ on X to [0, 1] such that µ(X) = 1, and moreover
for every countable collection (E i ) i∈I of pairwise disjoint sets in Σ. For a compact set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability measures on the Borel σ-field on X. A probability measure µ ∈ ∆(X) is completely mixed if µ(U ) > 0 for every non-empty open subset U of X.
In this paper we use two different metrics on the space ∆(X). For a non-empty set B ⊆ X, the distance d(x, B) between a point x ∈ X and the set B is
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The ε-neighborhood of B is B ε = {x ∈ X|d(x, B) < ε}. The weak metric is defined for µ, ν ∈ ∆(X) by
and the strong metric by
Note that for every µ and ν, ρ w (µ, ν) ≤ ρ s (µ, ν). This easily follows from the observation that for every B ∈ Σ, both µ(B) − ν(B ε ) and ν(B) − µ(B ε ) are smaller than or equal to |µ(B) − ν(B)| and therefore smaller than or equal to
The weak (strong) topology on ∆(X) is the topology induced by the weak (strong) metric. The inequality ρ w (µ, ν) ≤ ρ s (µ, ν) implies that the weak topology is included in the strong topology. Since X is compact, ∆(X) is compact with respect to the weak metric. Further, compactness and sequential compactness are equivalent for metric spaces.
Strategic form games
In this section we introduce the game theoretic notation used in this paper.
A strategic form game (with compact action spaces) is a triplet Γ = (N, A, u)
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of the players, A = i∈N A i is the set of profiles of actions, and u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) is the vector of payoff functions. We assume for every player i ∈ N that the set A i of actions is a non-empty compact subset of R, and that the payoff functions u i : A → R are continuous 2 .
The set ∆(A i ) is the set of (mixed) strategies of player i. We identify every action a i with the Dirac measure δ(a i ), the strategy that selects a i with probability 1. A vector σ = (σ i ) i∈N with σ i ∈ ∆(A i ) for all i is called a strategy profile. The set of strategy profiles is denoted 3 by ∆(A). For every strategy 2 Everything we do in this paper immediately generalizes to general compact metric spaces. In this context note that a compact metric space is automatically separable, so that the finitistic approach also has a bite in the general case.
3 With a slight abuse of notation we implicitly identify each strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈N with its induced probability distribution in ∆(A). Obviously not every element of ∆(A) can be obtained this way. We restrict attention to the independent elements of ∆(A) that are induced by strategy profiles.
Perfect equilibrium and compact action spaces 6 profile σ ∈ ∆(A) we define u i (σ) = u i dσ. Prokhorov's Theorem implies that u i (σ) is continuous in σ with respect to the weak metric ρ w on ∆(A) 4 .
We write
we denote the strategy profile where every player j = i adheres to strategy σ j , while player i uses τ i . A strategy τ i ∈ ∆(A i ) is called a best response of player i to the strategy profile
for all i and all τ i ∈ ∆(A i ). So, σ is a Nash equilibrium if each σ i is a best response to σ.
For a strategy profile σ, BR i (σ) is the set of best responses of player i to σ.
An action a i ∈ A i is a pure best response of player i to σ if δ(a i ) ∈ BR i (σ).
By PBR i (σ) we denote the set of pure best responses of player i to σ. The set PBR i (σ) is non-empty by compactness of A i and continuity of u i . Note that σ i is a best response to σ if and only if it puts weight 1 on pure best responses, i.e., σ i (PBR i (σ)) = 1. For a non-empty compact subset X i of A i ,
is the set of player i's best strategies against σ given that the pure choices of player i are restricted to actions in X i . By PBR i (σ | X i ) we denote the set of those actions of player i that belong to BR i (σ | X i ).
Perfect equilibrium
Selten [23] introduced the notion of perfect equilibrium for non-cooperative extensive form games. The definition of perfect equilibrium is based on the idea that a satisfactory interpretation of equilibrium points should accommodate possible slight mistakes. Selten showed that perfect equilibrium exists for finite extensive form games with perfect recall.
Twenty years later Simon and Stinchcombe [24] provided a general treatment of perfect equilibria for infinite strategic form games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. S&S discuss three distinct approaches to perfect equilibrium for infinite normal form games. In the first two approaches, as in Selten's original definition, players may "tremble", modeled by having players choose completely mixed strategies. Players are then required to play approximate best responses to opponents' trembling strategies. In the strong approach, a tremble assigns high probability to the set of pure best responses itself, while in the weak approach a tremble is only required to assign high probability to a neighborhood of this set. The third, limit-of-finite, approach applies traditional refinements to sequences of successively larger finite approximations of the original infinite game. S&S proved the existence of these three generalized notions of perfect equilibrium. Moreover, they showed that the set of strongly perfect equilibria is a closed, non-empty subset of the set of weakly perfect equilibria, which is a closed subset of the collection of limit admissible Nash equilibria.
Both the strong and weak approaches of S&S use a direct generalization of the notion of completely mixed strategies in the definition of perfect equilibrium.
Let ǫ > 0. A completely mixed strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈N in ∆(A) is a strongly ε-perfect equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N it holds that ρ
It is a weakly ǫ-perfect equilibrium if ρ w (σ i , BR i (σ)) < ǫ. 
In order to guarantee existence of limit points, the above definition only considers weak limits of ε-perfect equilibria. Finitistic perfection is based on a different approach where games with infinite action spaces are approximated by games with large, but still finite, action spaces. 
This definition has quite some appeal given our basic intuition that infinite games often serve as a proxy for large finite games, and that therefore strategic behavior should carry over from the finite setting to infinite games. Despite this basic intuition, S&S already noted that even in games with dominant actions lof perfection may fail to eliminate Nash equilibria that do not select this dominant action. In order to circumvent this drawback, we propose the following modification of lof perfection, which exclusively selects the dominant strategies in case such strategies are available to a player.
Definition 4.3
A strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈N is a strongly global-limitof-finite (strongly glof) perfect equilibrium if in Definition 4.2 condition 3) is replaced by
The strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈N is a weakly glof perfect equilibrium if in Definition 4.2 condition 3) is replaced by
S&S introduced the method of anchoring as a-partial-remedy to the failure of lof perfection to select limit admissible strategies. Anchoring requires us to select a priori a collection of actions that are considered to be indispensable for a player. Our approach is more flexible in the sense that the indispensability of selected strategies is allowed to be contingent on the approximating sequence of strategy profiles we consider.
Simon and Stinchcombe established existence of lof perfect equilibrium. We show that weakly glof perfect equilibrium exists, and that every weakly glof perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. The rather lengthy proof is deferred to Appendix A.
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Since clearly every strongly glof perfect equilibrium is also weakly glof, both strong and weak glof perfection refines the set of Nash equilibria. Existence of strongly glof perfect equilibrium remains an open question.
Admissibility
In this section we analyze the relation between the various notions of perfection and admissibility. We show that weak perfection exclusively selects limit undominated strategies. We also show that this statement is a genuine generalization of the classical result for finite games that perfection implies undominatedness.
For the finitistic approach the connection to admissibility is much weaker. As said before, in Example 2.4 S&S already present a lof perfect equilibrium that does not select the unique dominant strategy. We show that glof perfection performs better: for every game in which a player has dominant strategies, glof perfect equilibrium exclusively selects equilibria in which such a player plays one of his dominant strategies. However, the analogous result for undominated strategies again fails to hold. Example 1 presents a two-player game with a strongly glof perfect equilibrium in which both players play dominated strategies that are not limits of undominated strategies.
We say that
for all strategy profiles σ ∈ ∆(A), and the inequality is strict for at least one
for all σ ∈ ∆(A) and σ i ∈ ∆(A i ). The set of all dominant strategies for player i is denoted by D i . Obviously D i may be empty.
If there is no τ i that dominates σ i , we say that σ i is undominated. We denote the set of undominated strategies of player i by U i . We write σ i ∈ LU i if there exists a sequence (σ
Following S&S (1995), a strategy σ i is limit admissible if σ i (P U i ) = 1, where P U i denotes the closure of the set P U i .
Every limit undominated strategy is also limit admissible. The converse does not hold though, not even for finite strategic form games. In the table below the payoff matrix of player 2 is given:
The strategy σ 2 = ( 
Weak perfection and admissibility
S&S already showed that weakly perfect equilibrium is limit admissible. In this section we show the somewhat stronger claim that weakly perfect equilibrium strategies are limit undominated. We also show that this is the exact analogue of the classical result for finite games that perfect equilibrium strategies are undominated.
Theorem 5.1 Let σ be a weakly perfect equilibrium. Then σ i ∈ LU i for each i.
Proof.
By Definition 4.1 and Theorem 3.2 of Billingsley [3] , there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles
So, for every i ∈ N , there is a sequence τ
Since τ k i is a best response against the completely mixed profile σ k , by Lemma B.2, τ k i is undominated. Therefore σ i is limit undominated.
At first glance Theorem 5.1 seems to be a compromise between the well-known result for finite normal form games that the strategies in a perfect equilibrium are undominated, and the transition to infinite compact action spaces. The following Proposition shows that this compromise is only seemingly, since for finite games limit undominated strategies are in fact undominated.
Proposition 5.2 For strategic form games with finite action spaces, the set U i is closed, so that U i = LU i for such games.
Proof.
To prove that the set of undominated strategies is closed, we show that the set of dominated strategies is open. Suppose σ i is dominated by τ i . We
prove that there is an open set V ∋ σ i such that every ν i ∈ V is dominated as
Here, · ∞ denotes the maximum norm. Take
We show that
Since u i is linear in each player's strategy we have
Similarly we conclude for every σ −i ∈ ∆(A −i ) that
Hence,
Finitistic perfection and admissibility
The relation between finitistic perfection and admissibility is much weaker than it is for weakly perfect equilibrium. S&S already have an example of a game in which one of the players has a unique dominant action (see example 2.4 of Simon and Stinchcombe [24] ), while nevertheless there is a lof perfect equilibrium in this game in which the player in question does play a dominated action. Hence, even in games with dominant actions, lof perfection does not exclusively select limit admissible strategies.
We show that our alternative definition of finitistic perfection, glof perfect equilibrium, does select only dominant strategies in case such strategies are available to a player. In an example we show that for games without dominant strategies also glof perfect equilibrium may use strategies that are not limit admissible.
In Appendix B we show that D i is closed with respect to the weak metric in ∆(A i ), that PD i is closed in A i , and that 
Proof.
Because σ is a weakly glof equilibrium, for every player i there is a
So, for every k we can take τ 
Since u i is continuous, there are open sets V (a i ) ∋ a i and W (a −i ) ∋ a −i such that for every x i ∈ V (a i ) and x −i ∈ W (a −i ) we have
Take x i ∈ V (a i ). Since b i is a dominant strategy, we have
for large k by Definition 4.3. So, since σ k −i is a completely mixed strategy in Perfect equilibrium and compact action spaces
for large k. Hence, for large k, x i is not a best response to σ k . We conclude for
for large k. Now note that A i \ U is compact, since it is a closed subset of a compact set. Therefore, there are actions a
for large k. The action spaces are
in which each integer is an isolated point, whereas −∞ is the limit of the sequence −1, −2, ... and ∞ is the limit of the sequence 1, 2, . . .. The topological structure is shown in the picture below.
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The payoff functions u 1 and u 2 are symmetric and u 1 is given in the table below.
Player 1 is the row player, and player 2 is the column player. Claim. The action pair (∞, ∞) is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium. However, ∞ is not limit admissible for either player.
Proof. For either player, ∞ is not limit admissible because ∞ is dominated by every action k ∈ Z, and every action k ∈ N is dominated by action −k. Now, we prove that σ = (∞, ∞) is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium. For every player i = 1, 2 and k ∈ N, let B 
which tends to zero as k → ∞. Hence, condition 4 of Definition 4.3 is valid as well, and σ is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium.
Relations between definitions of perfect equilibrium
Simon and Stinchcombe [24] conjectured (on page 1433) that there are strongly perfect equilibria that are not anchored perfect. We provide a concrete example of a completely mixed, and therefore surely strongly perfect, equilibrium that is neither lof perfect nor glof perfect (and therefore also not anchored perfect).
Thus, the finitistic approach to perfection does not have a straightforward logical relation to the trembling hand approach.
The action spaces are A 1 = A 2 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , ∞, ∞ + 1}, where all natural numbers and ∞ + 1 are isolated points, whereas ∞ is the limit of the sequence 1, 2, . . . The topology is shown in the picture below:
The payoff functions u 1 and u 2 are symmetric and u 1 is given in the table below. Define the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 by
Claim. The strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a completely mixed, and hence strongly perfect equilibrium. However, it is neither lof perfect nor weakly glof perfect.
This verifies the conjecture of S&S [24] 6 .
Proof. It is clear that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium. Hence, it is a strongly perfect equilibrium.
We show that the completely mixed equilibrium is not lof perfect. Suppose by way of contradiction that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is lof perfect. For every player i, take a sequence (B We continue with a discussion of the relations between the different approaches to finitistic perfect equilibrium. Proposition 6.1 Every strongly glof perfect equilibrium is lof perfect.
Proof. Suppose that σ = (σ i ) i∈N is a strongly glof perfect equilibrium. Then, for every i ∈ N , there is a sequence (B 
is a closed, hence Borel, subset of the action space A i . Moreover, since best responses put weight 1 on pure best responses,
This implies that for large k, player i has a pure best response to σ k which lies in
and σ is a lof perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 5.3 shows that the lof perfect equilibrium in Example 2.4 in S&S is
not weakly glof perfect (and hence not strongly glof perfect either). Next we present an example of a weakly glof perfect equilibrium that is not lof perfect.
Consequently, lof perfection and weak glof perfection are not comparable.
EXAMPLE 3.
In this game the action spaces are
where all integers except 0 are isolated points, whereas 0 is the limit point of the sequences −1, −2, . . . and 1, 2, . . . The topological structure is shown in the picture below.
The topology can be metrized by the following metric. For every k, l ∈ A i ,
Claim. The Nash equilibrium (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (0, 0) is weakly glof perfect. However, (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is not lof perfect, and therefore by Proposition 6.1 not strongly glof perfect either.
Proof. We show that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a weakly glof perfect. For every k ∈ N, define
. Moreover, for k ∈ N and i = 1, 2, write
Let σ k i be the completely mixed strategy on B k i that assigns probability ε k to every action in B k i except action k, to which it assigns probability 1− (2k − 1)ε k . Note that due to the choice of ε k , we have 1 
It is easy to see that (2k − 1)ε k ≤ ε. Take an arbitrary set B ⊆ A 1 .
B. We show that σ
So, by A, B, and the choice of ε, ρ w (σ 
where σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ). Since −1 is an isolated point, w.l.o.g. −1 ∈ B i for each
we have
Thus, according to the payoff table,
Rewriting yields
Finally, in this section we present a modification of the example in S&S of a pure equilibrium that is limit of finite, while one of the players plays an action that is not limit admissible. Theorem 5.3 shows that the equilibrium is not weakly glof.
EXAMPLE 4
The game has two players with action spaces
and utility functions u 1 = 0 and
In the following picture the function a 1 → u 2 (a 1 , a 2 ) is depicted for a fixed action a 2 of player 2.
Claim. The action pair (0, 1) is a lof perfect equilibrium. However, a 2 = 0 is the unique dominant strategy, so that a 2 = 1 is not limit admissible. Consequently, the equilibrium is not weakly glof perfect.
The strategy a 2 = 0 is the unique dominant strategy for player 2, so that a 2 = 1 is not limit admissible. Hence, by Theorem 5.3, the pair (0, 1) is not weakly glof perfect.
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In order to show that (0, 1) is lof perfect, take ε ∈ (0, 1). For n ∈ N, consider the finite subsets 
Then for every a j 2 = j n , j = 1, . . . , n − 1 we have
This outcome is less than zero, but player 2 can get zero by choosing a n 2 = 1 in the set B n 2 . Hence, action pair (0, 1) is a lof perfect equilibrium.
Two players
For finite strategic form games it is well-known that perfection implies undominatedness. A similarly well-known theorem of van Damme (see for example van Damme [8] , Theorem 3.2.2) states that for bimatrix games the converse implication also holds.
Theorem 7.1 Let (p, q) be a strategy pair of the bimatrix game (A, B) . Equivalent are
The strategy pair (p, q) is a perfect equilibrium.
[2] The strategy pair (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium and both p and q are undominated strategies. (1) to (2) is also valid in the setting with infinite compact Perfect equilibrium and compact action spaces 22 action spaces. A natural guess would be that the appropriately adjusted converse would also be true for two-player infinite games. However, the following example shows that the converse implication from (2) to (1) no longer holds for games with infinite action spaces. (In their Example 2 Méndez et al. [15] address the same issue in a game with interval action spaces.) We prove that the action pair σ = (B, 1) is not a weakly perfect equilibrium.
Take any completely mixed strategy τ 1 = (p, 1 − p) of player 1. Take a natural
Since u 2 (τ 1 , δ(1)) = 0, this implies that δ(1) is not a best response for player 2 against any completely mixed strategy of player 1. Hence, σ = (B, 1) is not a weakly perfect equilibrium.
Note that the above example is in a very strong sense minimal. The action space A 2 is in a very natural way the "smallest" example of a compact set that is not finite. And also A 1 is minimal in the sense that it is the smallest example of an action space in which player 1 actually has a genuine choice to make.
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Invariance
Another remarkable feature of the game in Example 5 is that (B, ∞) is a strongly (and hence also weakly) perfect equilibrium. This is surprising in the sense that ∞ is payoff equivalent to 1 for player 2. Thus, both strong and weak perfection violate invariance in this setting, while perfect equilibrium satisfies invariance in the setting of finite strategic form games (see for example Mertens [18] and Vermeulen and Jansen [25] ).
The underlying cause of this seeming breakdown of invariance is that in the finite case the space of actions is, from a topological perspective, a very simple object. All actions are isolated points, and hence there is a homeomorphism that transforms one into the other while the induced transformation on payoffs equals the identity in the case of payoff equivalence.
However, in the infinite case two actions giving the same payoff might be totally different from a topological perspective. Therefore, only conditional on having a homeomorphism that preserves payoffs, we can conclude that strong and weak perfection are invariant too. This result is stated in the following theorem. Note that, for finite games, invariance with respect to payoff preserving homeomorphic transformations is in fact equivalent to invariance. Hence, the above Theorem implies that for finite strategic form games perfect equilibrium is invariant.
Discussion
We studied the relations between various generalizations of the basic notion of perfect equilibrium to the context of strategic form games with compact action spaces and continuous payoff functions. We showed the existence of weakly glof perfect equilibrium, and presented several examples of games with compact action spaces that clarify the relationships between admissibility, trembling hand perfect equilibrium, and finitistic perfect equilibrium.
Specifically, we showed in Example 5 that the equivalence between perfection and undominatedness for bimatrix games no longer holds for general two-person strategic form games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs.
We also verified a conjecture of Simon and Stichcombe [24] with an example of a completely mixed Nash equilibrium that is not perfect in any of the finitistic definitions. Despite its appeal to basic intuition of the finitistic approach, our results (especially Examples 1 and 2) seem to imply a severe critique on the finitistic approach. Example 1 shows that finitistic perfection may easily fail to be limit admissible, a fact that was already observed by Simon and Stinchcombe for lof perfection. Example 2 shows that a completely mixed equilibrium need not be perfect in any of the finitistic approaches.
In Example 2 the completely mixed equilibrium is part of a component of Nash Let X and Y be two metric spaces. A correspondence between X and Y is a map from the elements of X to the collection of all subsets of Y . So, for every x ∈ X, we have F (x) ⊆ Y . A correspondence F between X and Y is upperhemicontinuous if for every x ∈ X and every sequence (x n ) ∞ n=1 in X converging to x and every sequence (y n ) ∞ n=1 in Y converging to y with y n ∈ F (x n ) it holds that y ∈ F (x). A point x ∈ X is called a fixed point for a correspondence
Theorem A.1 (Kakutani's fixed point theorem) Let X be a non-empty, compact and convex subset of an Euclidean space. Let F : X ։ X be an upperhemicontinuous correspondence such that F (x) is non-empty, closed and convex for all x ∈ X. Then F has a fixed point. 
B3.
We prove that ABR k i (σ) is convex for every i. Take strategies µ, ν ∈ ABR k i (σ). We prove that cµ
Take an arbitrary δ > 2 k . Then, for every non-empty measurable set A ⊆ A i , we have 
B Proofs for Section 5
Lemma B.1 Suppose that τ i dominates σ i . Then there is an a −i ∈ A −i such that u i (a −i , τ i ) > u i (a −i , σ i ).
Proof. Suppose that u i (a −i , τ i ) = u i (a −i , σ i ) for every a −i ∈ A −i . Then, for every σ −i ∈ ∆(A −i ) we have u i (σ −i , τ i ) = u i (σ −i , σ i ). Contradiction.
Lemma B.2 Suppose that strategy τ i ∈ ∆(A i ) dominates σ i ∈ ∆(A i ). Then
for any completely mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(A). Consequently, any best response to a completely mixed strategy profile is undominated.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma B.1 and the continuity of the payoff function u i on ∆(A).
The next Theorem is a direct consequence of the monotonicity of measure.
Lemma B.3 Suppose that f is a real function on X which is strictly positive and µ is a measure on X such that µ(X) > 0. Then, F n = X. Consequently, µ(F n ) ↑ µ(X) when n → ∞. Since µ(X) > 0, there exists an n ∈ N such that µ(F n ) > 0 . But for every x ∈ X, f (x) ≥ 1 n 1 Fn (x). Therefore,
Thus, 
Proof.
Assume that D i is non-empty, otherwise the statements are obvious.
Take a ρ i ∈ D i . For every σ −i ∈ ∆(A −i ) define
Since u i is a continuous function on ∆(A i ) with respect to the weak metric, 
